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Abstract—We consider private polynomial computation (PPC)
over noncolluding coded databases. In such a setting a user
wishes to compute a multivariate polynomial of degree at most
g over f variables (or messages) stored in multiple databases
while revealing no information about the desired polynomial to
the databases. We construct two novel PPC schemes, where the
first is a generalization of our previous work in private linear
computation for coded databases. In this scheme we consider
Reed-Solomon coded databases with Lagrange encoding, which
leverages ideas from recently proposed star-product private
information retrieval and Lagrange coded computation. The
second scheme considers the special case of coded databases
with systematic Lagrange encoding. Both schemes yield improved
rates compared to the best known schemes from the literature
for a small number of messages, while in the asymptotic case the
rates match.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of private information retrieval (PIR) was in-
troduced by Chor et al. in the computer science community
[1]. The goal of PIR is to allow a user to privately access an
arbitrary message stored in a set of databases, i.e., without
revealing any information of the identity of the requested
message to each database. The design of PIR protocols has
focused on the case when multiple databases store the mes-
sages. This connects to the active and renowned research area
of distributed storage systems (DSSs), where the messages
are encoded by an [n, k] linear code and then distributed and
stored across n storage nodes. The study and design of efficient
PIR protocols for coded DSSs have attracted a great deal of
attention in recent years [2]–[6].
Private computation is a generalization of PIR that addresses
the private computation for functions of the stored messages
[7]–[13]. The scenario of noncolluding replicated databases
for linear functions is considered in [7], [8] and referred to as
private linear computation (PLC). The coded case is addressed
in [10]–[13]. In particular, in [11], [12] we proposed a PLC
scheme based on maximum distance separable (MDS) coded
storage, where the obtained PLC capacity is equal to the
MDS-coded PIR capacity in [4]. In [10], private polynomial
computation (PPC) over t colluding and systematically coded
databases is considered by generalizing the star-product PIR
scheme of [3]. In that work, functions are computed that are
polynomials of degree at most g, and a private computation
rate equal to the best asymptotic PIR rate (when the number of
messages tends to infinity) of MDS-coded storage is achieved
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for g = t = 1. An alternative PPC approach was recently
proposed in [13] by employing Reed-Solomon (RS) coded
databases with Lagrange encoding. For low code rates, the
scheme improves on the private computation rate of [10].
In this work, we present two new approaches for PPC over
coded databases by leveraging our previous works for PLC
in [11], [12], ideas from star-product PIR [3], and Lagrange
coded computation [14]. Our schemes apply to noncolluding
RS-coded databases with Lagrange encoding. Compared to
the scheme in [13], our first proposed PPC scheme yields a
higher private computation rate when the number of messages
is small. In addition, we construct a second PPC scheme for
RS-coded databases with systematic Lagrange encoding that
improves on the rate of the PPC scheme presented in [10].
In both cases, as the number of messages tends to infinity,
the rate approaches those of [13] and [10], respectively. For
the outer bound, we adopt our coded PLC capacity of [12,
Thm. 2] since PPC can be seen as an extension of PLC.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notation
We denote by N the set of all positive integers, [a] ,
{1, 2, . . . , a}, and [a : b] , {a, a + 1, . . . , b} for a, b ∈ N,
a ≤ b. A random variable is denoted by a capital Roman letter,
e.g., X , while its realization is denoted by the corresponding
small Roman letter, e.g., x. Vectors are boldfaced, e.g., X
denotes a random vector and x denotes a deterministic vector,
respectively. Random matrices are represented by bold sans
serif letters, e.g., X, where X represents its realization. In
addition, sets are denoted by calligraphic uppercase letters,
e.g., X . (·)T denotes the transpose operator, H(X) represents
the entropy ofX , and I(X ;Y ) the mutual information between
X and Y . The binomial coefficient of a over b, a, b ∈ {0}∪N,
is denoted by
(
a
b
)
where
(
a
b
)
, 0 if a < b. We use the custom-
ary code parameters [n, k] to denote a code C over the finite
field Fq of blocklength n and dimension k. The function χ(x)
denotes the support of a vector x, and the linear span of a set of
vectors {x1, . . . ,xa}, a ∈ N, is denoted by span{x1, . . . ,xa}.
A monomial W i in f variables W (1), . . . ,W (f) with degree
g is written as W i = (W (1))i1(W (2))i2 · · · (W (f))if , where
i , (i1, . . . , if) ∈ ({0} ∪ N)
f is the exponent vector with
wt(i) ,
∑f
j=1 ij = g. Finally, a polynomial φ(W ) of
degree at most g is represented as φ(W ) =
∑
i:wt(i)≤g aiW
i,
ai ∈ Fq. Fq[z] denotes the set of all univariate polynomials
over Fq in the variable z. We denote by deg(φ(z)) the degree
of a polynomial φ(z) ∈ Fq[z].
B. Preliminaries
Definition 1 (Star-product). Let C and D be two linear codes
of length n over Fq. The star-product (Hadamard product) of
v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ C and u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ D is defined
as v ⋆ u = (v1u1, . . . , vnun) ∈ F
n
q . Further, the star-product
of C and D , denoted by C ⋆ D , is defined by span{v ⋆ u :
v ∈ C ,u ∈ D} and the g-fold star-product of C with itself is
given by C ⋆g = span{v1 ⋆ · · · ⋆ vg : vi ∈ C , i ∈ [g]}.
Definition 2 (Reed-Solomon code). Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) be
a vector of n distinct nonzero elements of Fq. For n ∈ N,
k ∈ [n], and q > n, the [n, k] RS code (over Fq) is defined as
RSk(α) , {(φ(α1), . . . , φ(αn)) : φ ∈ Fq[z], deg(φ) < k}. (1)
It is well-known that RS codes are MDS codes that behave
well under the star-product. We state the following proposition
that was introduced in [3].
Proposition 1. Let RSk(α) be a length-n RS code. Then, for
g ∈ N, the g-fold star-product of RSk(α) with itself is the
RS code given by RS⋆gk (α) = RSmin {g(k−1)+1,n}(α).
Let γ = (γ1, . . . , γk) be a vector of k distinct elements
of Fq. For a message vector W = (W1, . . . ,Wk), let ℓ(z) ∈
Fq[z] be a polynomial of degree at most k−1 such that ℓ(γi) =
Wi for all i ∈ [k]. Using the Lagrange interpolation formula
we present this polynomial as ℓ(z) =
∑
i∈[k] Wiιi(z), where
ιi(z) is the Lagrange basis polynomial
ιi(z) =
∏
t∈[k]\{i}
z − γt
γi − γt
.
It has been shown in [13] that Lagrange encoding is equiva-
lent to the choice of a specific basis for an RS code. Thus, for
encoding we choose the set of Lagrange basis polynomials as
the code generating polynomials of (1) [14]. Thus, a generator
matrix of RSk(α) is GRSk(α, γ) = (ιi(αj)), i ∈ [k], j ∈ [n].
Note that if we choose γi = αi for i ∈ [k], then the generator
matrix GRSk(α, γ) becomes systematic.
The set {W i : i ∈ ({0} ∪ N)f , 1 ≤ wt(i) ≤ g} of all
monomials in f variables of degree at most g has size
M(f, g) ,
g∑
h=1
(
h+ f − 1
h
)
=
(
g + f
g
)
− 1,
and the total number of polynomials in f variables of degree at
most g generated with all possible distinct (up to scalar mul-
tiplication) M(f, g)-dimensional coefficients vectors defined
over Fq is equal to µ(f, g) ,
qM(f,g)−1
q−1 .
C. System Model
An RS-coded DSS is described as follows. The DSS stores
in total f independent messages W(1), . . . ,W(f), where each
message W(m) =
(
W
(m)
i,j
)
, m ∈ [f ], is a random β×k matrix
with some β, k ∈ N, where each entry is chosen independently
and uniformly at random from Fq. Thus, H(W
(m)) = βk ,
L, ∀m ∈ [f ] (in q-ary units).
Each message is encoded using an [n, k] RS code as follows.
Let W
(m)
i =
(
W
(m)
i,1 , . . . ,W
(m)
i,k
)
, i ∈ [β], be a message
vector corresponding to the i-th row of W(m). Each W
(m)
i
is encoded by an RS code RSk(α) with evaluation vector
α = (α1, . . . , αn) over Fq into a length-n codeword C
(m)
i
where C
(m)
i = W
(m)
i GRSk(α,γ) =
(
C
(m)
i,1 , . . . , C
(m)
i,n
)
and
C
(m)
i,j = ℓ
(m)
i (αj), j ∈ [n], where ℓ
(m)
i (z) is the Lagrange
interpolation polynomial associated with the length-k message
segment W
(m)
i . The βf generated codewords C
(m)
i are then
arranged in the array C =
(
(C(1))T| . . . |(C(f))T
)
T
of dimen-
sions βf × n, where C(m) =
(
(C
(m)
1 )
T| . . . |(C
(m)
β )
T
)
T
. The
code symbols C
(m)
1,j , . . . , C
(m)
β,j , m ∈ [f ], for all f messages
are stored on the j-th database, j ∈ [n].
D. Private Polynomial Computation for RS-Coded DSSs
We consider the case of n noncolluding databases. A user
wishes to privately compute exactly one polynomial out of µ
candidate polynomial functions X
(1), . . . ,X(µ) from the RS-
coded DSS while keeping the requested index private from
each database. The polynomial function X(v) =
(
φ(v)(Wi,j)
)
,
where Wi,j = (W
(1)
i,j , . . . ,W
(f)
i,j ), is a β × k random matrix
for some polynomial φ(v), where each φ(v)(Wi,j) ∈ Fq is
independent and distributed according to some probability
mass function PXv . Thus, H(X
(v)) = LH(Xv), ∀ v ∈ [µ],
and H(X(1), . . . ,X(µ)) = LH(X1, . . . , Xµ).
Consider an RS-coded DSS with n noncolluding databases
storing f messages. The user wishes to retrieve the v-th poly-
nomial function X
(v)
, v ∈ [µ], from the available information
from queries Q
(v)
j and answer strings A
(v)
j , j ∈ [n]. For a PPC
protocol, the following conditions must be satisfied ∀ v ∈ [µ],
[Privacy]
I
(
v ;Q
(v)
j , A
(v)
j ,X
(1), . . . ,X(µ)
)
= 0, ∀ j ∈ [n],
[Recovery]
H
(
X
(v)
∣∣A(v)1 , . . . , A(v)n , Q(v)1 , . . . , Q(v)n ) = 0.
Definition 3 (PPC rate for RS-coded DSSs). The rate of a
PPC scheme, denoted by R, is defined as R = L/D, where D
is the total required download cost.1
Definition 4 (τ -sum). For τ ∈ [µ], a sum φ(v1)(Ci1,j)+ · · ·+
φ(vτ )(Ciτ ,j), where Ci,j = (C
(1)
i,j , . . . , C
(f)
i,j ), i ∈ [β], j ∈
[n], of τ distinct candidate polynomial function evaluations is
called a τ -sum for any (i1, . . . , iτ ) ∈ [β]
τ , and {v1, . . . , vτ} ⊆
[µ] determines the type of the τ -sum.
III. A GENERAL PPC SCHEME FOR RS-CODED DSSS
WITH LAGRANGE ENCODING
In the following we build a PPC scheme based on Lagrange
encoding and our PLC scheme in [12]. Note that a polynomial
can be written as a linear combination of monomials, and
therefore any private monomial computation (PMC) scheme
is a special case of PPC. Thus, a PPC scheme can be obtained
from a PLC scheme by replacing independent messages with
a monomial basis. We first discuss the PPC case in general
and then provide an example for the special case of PMC.
1In order to compare with the PPC schemes from [10], [13], we use a
slightly imprecise definition of the PPC rate. The exact information-theoretic
PPC rate is defined as the ratio of the minimum desired polynomial function
size Lminv∈[µ] H(Xv) over the total required download cost D.
A. Lagrange Coded Computation
Lagrange coded computation [14] is a framework that can
be applied to any function computation when the function
of interest is a multivariate polynomial of the messages. We
extend the application of this framework to PMC and PPC by
utilizing the following argument.
Recall that ℓ
(m)
t (z), t ∈ [β], m ∈ [f ], evaluated at γj results
in an information symbol W
(m)
t,j and when evaluated at αj we
obtain a code symbol C
(m)
t,j . Let ℓt(z) = (ℓ
(1)
t (z), . . . , ℓ
(f)
t (z))
be a vector of f Lagrange interpolation polynomials associated
with the messagesW
(1)
t , . . . ,W
(f)
t . Now, given a multivariate
polynomial function φ(Wt,j) of degree at most g, we intro-
duce the composition function ψt(z) = φ(ℓt(z)). Accordingly,
evaluating ψt(z) at any γj , j ∈ [k], is equal to evaluating the
polynomial function over the uncoded information symbols,
i.e., φ(Wt,j) and similarly, evaluating ψt(z) at αj , j ∈ [n],
will result in the evaluation of the polynomial function over
the coded symbols, i.e., φ(Ct,j). Since each Lagrange interpo-
lation polynomial of ℓt(z) is a polynomial of degree at most
k − 1, it follows that deg(ψt(z)) ≤ g(k − 1) and we require
up to g(k − 1) + 1 coefficients to interpolate and determine
the polynomial ψt(z).
Note that ψt(z) is a linear combination of monomials
zi ∈ Fq[z], i ≤ g(k − 1), and the underlying code C˜ for
(ψt(α1), . . . , ψt(αn)), referred to as the decoding code, is
given by the g-fold star-product RS⋆gk (α) of the storage code
RSk(α) according to [13, Lem. 7]. This is due to the fact
that the span of RS⋆gk (α) is given by linear combinations of
codewords in RS⋆gk (α) where each code symbol represents a
monomial. With other words, to construct coded PPC schemes
that retrieve polynomials of degree at most g, we require
g(k − 1) + 1 ≤ n and dC˜
min
≥ n− (g(k − 1) + 1) + 1, where
dC˜
min
denotes the minimum distance of C˜ , to be able to decode
the computation correctly. It follows from Proposition 1 that
C˜ = RS k˜(α) with dimension k˜ = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n} =
g(k− 1)+ 1 and dC˜
min
= n− k˜+1 = n− (g(k− 1)+ 1) + 1.
B. PPC Achievable Rate Matrix
Similar to [12, Def. 3], where we introduce the notion of
a PIR achievable rate matrix for the coded PLC problem, we
provide the following definition for the PPC case.
Definition 5. A ν × n binary matrix Λκ,ν is called a PPC
achievable rate matrix for (C , C˜ ) if the following conditions
are satisfied.
1) The Hamming weight of each column of Λκ,ν is κ, and
2) for each matrix row λi, i ∈ [ν], χ(λi) is always an
information set for C˜ .
C. Redundancy Elimination
Here, we generalize the coded PLC scheme of [12] in terms
of exploiting the dependency between the virtual messages.
Since any polynomial is a linear function of the monomial
basis of size M(f, g), a PPC scheme can be seen as a PLC
scheme performed over a set of M(f, g) messages. Hence, the
redundancy resulting from the linear dependencies between the
virtual messages is also present for PPC and we can extend
[12, Lem. 1] and [8, Lem. 1] to our scheme. To exploit the
dependency between the virtual messages we adopt a similar
sign assignment process to each queried symbol of the virtual
monomial messages, based on the desired function index v
as introduced in [8, Sec. IV.B]. This will result in a uniquely
solvable equation system from the different τ -sum types given
the side information available from all other databases. By
obtaining such a system of equations in each round τ ∈ [µ]
of the protocol, the user can determine some of the answers
offline.
Now, consider 1-sum types, where we download individual
segments of each virtual message including f independent
messages. For these types, the user can determine any poly-
nomial from the f obtained message segments. Based on this
insight we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let µ ∈ [f : µ(f, g)] be the number of candidate
polynomials, including the f independent messages. For each
query set, for all v ∈ [µ], each database j ∈ [n], and based
on the queried segments from the f independent messages,
there are
(
µ−f
1
)
redundant 1-sum types out of all possible
types
(
µ
1
)
. On the other hand, for τ ∈ [2 : µ], there are(
max{µ−M(f,g),0}
τ
)
redundant τ -sum types out of
(
µ
τ
)
types.
The number of nonredundant τ -sum types with τ > 1 is given
by ρ(µ, τ) ,
(
µ
τ
)
−
(
max{µ−M(f,g),0}
τ
)
.
D. Achievable PPC Rate
Since C˜ is an [n, k˜] MDS code (C is an RS code), there
always exists a PPC achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν with (κ, ν) =
(k˜, n) for (C , C˜ ). Hence, using Lemma 1 we can prove the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] RS code
C to store f messages over n noncolluding databases using
Lagrange encoding. Let µ ∈ [f : µ(f, g)] be the number of
candidate polynomials to be computed of degree at most g,
g(k − 1) + 1 ≤ n, including the f independent messages.
Then, the PPC rate
RPPC =
knµ−1
f k˜
µ
+
∑µ
τ=2 ρ(µ, τ)k˜
µ−τ+1(
n− k˜
)τ−1
is achievable.
We remark that the PPC scheme requires the length of each
message to be L = k · νµ. Note that our proposed scheme
cannot readily be obtained using the concept of refinement
and lifting of so-called one-shot schemes as introduced for
PIR in [15], since this concept cannot readily be applied to
the function computation case.
We now provide further insight into our proposed PPC
scheme by considering the PMC scheme as a special case
in which the candidate set is restricted to contain monomials.
E. Special Case: PMC Scheme
1) Candidate Monomials: As the rate of PMC is a decreas-
ing function of the number of candidate monomial functions,
we can limit ourselves to the set of monomials excluding
parallel monomials, where we define a parallel monomial
as a monomial resulting from raising another monomial to
a positive integer power, i.e., to {W i : i ∈ ({0} ∪ N)f , 1 ≤
wt(i) ≤ g, i | p, p ∈ Pg}, where Pg denotes the set of prime
numbers less or equal to g and i = (i1, . . . , if ) | p means that
all nonzero ij , j ∈ [f ], are divisors of p. For example, for
a bivariate monomial over the variables x and y of degree at
most g = 2 the set of possible monomials is {x, y, xy, x2, y2}.
Note that x2 is a parallel monomial as it can be obtained
by raising the monomial x to the power of 2. Thus, x2 and
y2 are parallel monomials and can be excluded from the set
of candidate monomials. Denote by P = {p1, . . . , p|P|} an
arbitrary nonempty subset of Pg . By applying the Legendre
formula for counting the prime numbers less or equal to g, we
obtain the number of nonparallel monomials as
ĂM(f, g) =
(
g + f
g
)
− 1
+
∑
∀P⊆Pg:P6=∅,
p1···p|P|≤g
(−1)|P|




⌊
g
p1···p|P|
⌋
+ f⌊
g
p1···p|P|
⌋

− 1

,
where ⌊·⌋ denotes the floor function.
We illustrate the key concept of our proposed scheme in
Theorem 1 with an example. Note that in all examples we
assume that the index preparation step has been performed
to keep the desired polynomial index private. We refer the
readers to [12, Sec. IV-A] for details. Before we proceed with
the example, given a ν × n PPC achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν ,
we define the notion of PPC interference matrices as follows.
Definition 6 ([12, Def. 5]). For a given ν×n PPC achievable
rate matrix Λκ,ν = (λu,j) for (C , C˜ ), we define the PPC
interference matrices Aκ×n = (ai,j) and B(ν−κ)×n = (bi,j)
for the code C˜ with
ai,j , u if λu,j = 1, ∀j ∈ [n], i ∈ [κ], u ∈ [ν],
bi,j , u if λu,j = 0, ∀j ∈ [n], i ∈ [ν − κ], u ∈ [ν].
Note that in Definition 6, for each j ∈ [n], distinct values
of u ∈ [ν] should be assigned for all i. Thus, the assignment
is not unique in the sense that the order of the entries of each
column of A and B can be permuted.
Example 1. Consider two messages W(1) and W(2) that are
stored in a noncolluding DSS using a [4, 2] RS code C . Sup-
pose that the user wishes to obtain a monomial function X(v)
from the candidate set {W(1),W(2),W(1)⋆W(2)} of monomial
functions, i.e., µ = ĂM(2, 2) = 3. We have k˜ = g(k−1)+1 = 3
and
Λ3,4 =


1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1


is a valid PPC achievable rate matrix for (C , C˜ ). From Λ3,4
we further obtain the interference matrices
A3×4 =

1 1 1 22 2 3 3
3 4 4 4

 and B1×4 = (4 3 2 1).
TABLE I
QUERY SETS FOR A [4, 2] RS-CODED DSS WITH LAGRANGE ENCODING
STORING f = 2 MESSAGES AND WHERE THE FIRST (v = 1) MONOMIAL IS
PRIVATELY COMPUTED FOR g = 2 AND µ = 3.
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j
(D; 1) x1:9,1, x10:18,1, x19:27,1 x1:9,2, x10:18,2, x28:36,2 x1:9,3, x19:27,3, x28:36,3 x10:18,2, x19:27,3, x28:36,4
Q
(1)
j
(U ; 1) y1:9,1, y10:18,1, y19:27,1 y1:9,2, y10:18,2, y28:36,2 y1:9,3, y19:27,3, y28:36,3 y10:18,2, y19:27,3, y28:36,4
Q
(1)
j
(D; 2)
x37:39,1 + y28:30,1 x37:39,2 + y19:21,2 x37:39,3 + y10:12,3 x43:45,4 + y1:3,4
x40:42,1 + z28:30,1 x40:42,2 + z19:21,2 x40:42,3 + z10:12,3 x46:48,4 + z1:3,4
x43:45,1 + y31:33,1 x43:45,2 + y22:24,2 x49:51,3 + y13:15,3 x49:51,4 + y4:6,4
x46:48,1 + z31:33,1 x46:48,2 + z22:24,2 x52:54,3 + z13:15,3 x52:54,4 + z4:6,4
x49:51,1 + y34:36,1 x55:57,2 + y25:27,2 x55:57,3 + y16:18,3 x55:57,4 + y7:9,4
x52:54,1 + z34:36,1 x58:60,2 + z25:27,2 x58:60,3 + z16:18,3 x58:60,4 + z7:9,4
Q
(1)
j
(U ; 2)
y40:42,1 + z37:39,1 y40:42,2 + z37:39,2 y40:42,3 + z37:39,3 y46:48,4 + z43:45,4
y46:48,1 + z43:45,1 y46:48,2 + z43:45,2 y52:54,3 + z49:51,3 y52:54,4 + z49:51,4
y52:54,1 + z49:51,1 y58:60,2 + z55:57,2 y58:60,3 + z55:57,3 y58:60,4 + z55:57,4
Q
(1)
j
(D; 3)
x61,1 + y58,1 + z55,1 x61,2 + y52,2 + z49,2 x61,3 + y46,3 + z43,3 x62,4 + y40,4 + z37,4
x62,1 + y59,1 + z56,1 x62,2 + y53,2 + z50,2 x63,3 + y47,3 + z44,3 x63,4 + y41,4 + z38,4
x63,1 + y60,1 + z57,1 x64,2 + y54,2 + z51,2 x64,3 + y48,3 + z45,3 x64,4 + y42,4 + z39,4
We simplify notation by letting xt,j = C
(1)
t,j , yt,j = C
(2)
t,j ,
and zt,j = C
(1)
t,j · C
(2)
t,j for all t ∈ [β], j ∈ [n], where β =
νµ = 64. Let the desired monomial function index be v = 1.
The construction of the query sets is briefly presented in the
following steps.2
Initialization (Round τ = 1): We start with τ = 1 to gen-
erate query sets for each database j holding κµ = 27 distinct
instances of xt,j . By message symmetry this also applies to
yt,j and zt,j .
Following Rounds (τ ∈ [2 : 3]): Using the interference
matrices A3×4 and B1×4 for the exploitation of side informa-
tion for the j-th database, j ∈ [n], we generate the desired
query sets Q
(1)
j (D; τ) by querying a number of new symbols
of the desired monomial jointly combined with symbols from
other monomials queried in the previous round from database
i 6= j. Next, the undesired query sets Q
(1)
j (U ; τ) (if τ = 2)
are generated by enforcing message symmetry. We make the
final modification to the query sets by removing all redundant
1-sum types from the first round (see Lemma 1) and update
the query sets. This translates to removing the queries for zt,j ,
since they can be generated offline by the user given xt,j and
yt,j . The resulting query sets are shown in Table I, where
ua:b,j , (ua,j, . . . , ub,j) for u = x, y, z. The PMC rate of the
scheme is equal to kν
µ
D
= 2×4
3
3×4×28 = 0.3810.
IV. PPC SCHEME FOR RS-CODED DSSS WITH
SYSTEMATIC LAGRANGE ENCODING
In this section, we consider the case of RS-coded DSSs with
systematic Lagrange encoding and first adapt the concept of a
PPC achievable rate matrix from Definition 5 to this scenario
by extending [6, Def. 14]. In contrast to the PPC scheme in
Section III, the basic idea is to utilize the systematic part of
the RS code to recover the requested function.
Definition 7. A ν × n binary matrix ΛSκ,ν is called a PPC
systematic achievable rate matrix for (C , C˜ ) if the following
conditions are satisfied.
1) ΛSκ,ν is a κ-column regular matrix, and
2) there are exactly κ rows {λi}i∈[κ] and ν − κ rows
{λi+κ}i∈[ν−κ] of Λ
S
κ,ν such that ∀ i ∈ [κ], χ(λi)
2With some abuse of notation, the generated queries are sets containing
their answers, and vectors should be considered as the union of their entries.
TABLE II
QUERY SETS FOR A [4, 2] RS-CODED DSS WITH SYSTEMATIC LAGRANGE
ENCODING STORING f = 2 MESSAGES AND WHERE THE FIRST (v = 1)
MONOMIAL IS PRIVATELY COMPUTED FOR g = 2 AND µ = 3.
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j
(D; 1) x1:4,1, x9:12,1 x5:8,2, x9:12,2 x1:4,3, x5:8,3 x1:4,4, x5:8,4
Q
(1)
j
(U ; 1) y1:4,1, y9:12,1 y5:8,2, y9:12,2 y1:4,3, y5:8,3 y1:4,4, y5:8,4
Q
(1)
j
(D; 2)
x13:14,1 + y5:6,1 x17:18,2 + y1:2,2 x13:14,3 + y9:10,3 x13:14,4 + y9:10,4
x15:16,1 + z5:6,1 x19:20,2 + z1:2,2 x15:16,3 + z9:10,3 x15:16,4 + z9:10,4
x21:22,1 + y7:8,1 x21:22,2 + y3:4,2 x17:18,3 + y11:12,3 x17:18,4 + y11:12,4
x23:24,1 + z7:8,1 x23:24,2 + z3:4,2 x19:20,3 + z11:12,3 x19:20,4 + z11:12,4
Q
(1)
j
(U ; 2)
y15:16,1 + z13:14,1 y19:20,2 + z17:18,2 y15:16,3 + z13:14,3 y15:16,4 + z13:14,4
y23:24,1 + z21:22,1 y23:24,2 + z21:22,2 y19:20,3 + z17:18,3 y19:20,4 + z17:18,4
Q
(1)
j
(D; 3)
x25,1 + y19,1 + z17,1 x26,2 + y15,2 + z13,2 x25,3 + y23,3 + z21,3 x25,4 + y23,4 + z21,4
x27,1 + y20,1 + z18,1 x27,2 + y16,2 + z14,2 x26,3 + y24,3 + z22,3 x26,4 + y24,4 + z22,4
contains an information set for C˜ and ∀ i ∈ [ν − κ],
χ(λi+κ) = [k].
Using Lemma 1, the following theorem follows since it can
be proved that a PPC systematic achievable rate matrix ΛSκ,ν
with (κ, ν) =
(
k, k +min{k, n− k˜}
)
always exists.
Theorem 2. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] RS code
C to store f messages over n noncolluding databases using
systematic Lagrange encoding. Let µ ∈ [f : µ(f, g)] be the
number of candidate polynomials to be computed of degree
at most g, g(k − 1) + 1 ≤ n, including the f independent
messages. Then, the PPC rate
R
S
PPC =
νµ
n
[
fkµ−1 +
∑µ
τ=2 ρ(µ, τ)k
µ−τ
(
ν − k
)τ−1] ,
with ν = k +min{k, n− k˜}, is achievable.
Example 2. Consider the same scenario as in Example 1
where n = 4, k = 2, and k˜ = 3. It follows that ν = k +
min{k, n− k˜} = 3 and
ΛS2,3 =

1 0 1 10 1 1 1
1 1 0 0


is a valid PPC systematic achievable rate matrix. We further
obtain (by adapting Definition 6 correspondingly)
AS2×4 =
(
1 2 1 1
3 3 2 2
)
and BS1×4 =
(
2 1 3 3
)
from ΛS2,3. The resulting query sets are shown in Table II for
µ = 3, where ua:b,j , (ua,j , . . . , ub,j) for u = x, y, z, and the
PMC rate kν
µ
D
= 2×3
3
2×4×15 = 0.45 is achievable.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In Fig. 1, we compare the PPC rates of Theorems 1 and 2
to those of the schemes from [10], [13] for n = 5, k = 2, and
g = 2. The proposed schemes show improved performance for
a low number of messages f . Observe that the curves converge
to the rates from [10], [13] as the number of messages f grows.
In fact, it can easily be seen from the rate expressions of
Theorems 1 and 2 that this is always the case (details omitted
for brevity). For comparison, we also plot the PMC rate when
parallell monomials are excluded (magenta and purple lines).
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PPC scheme [13]
Fig. 1. Achievable PPC rates as a function of the number of messages f for
n = 5, k = 2, and g = 2.
VI. CONVERSE BOUND
Since RS codes are MDS codes and PPC can be seen as an
extension of PLC, we can adapt the coded PLC capacity of [12,
Thm. 2] to be an outer bound to the PPC rate. However, for
an infinite number of messages the PPC rates of our proposed
schemes, as for the schemes of [10], [13], do not approach this
outer bound, and it is still unknown whether the PLC capacity
can be achieved by a coded PPC scheme.
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